Abstract
An agent’s preference ordering is cyclical if for some finite sequence x 1, x 2, …, x n , he strictly prefers each subsequent object in the sequence to the immediately preceding one, and he also strictly prefers the first object in the sequence to the one that comes last. Letting “x <y ” stand for “y is strictly preferred to x”, we have a cyclical preference if the following is the case:
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Rabinowicz, W. (2000). Money Pump with Foresight. In: Almeida, M.J. (eds) Imperceptible Harms and Benefits. Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy, vol 8. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4144-4_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-4144-4_7
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