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Valuation and Objectivity in Science

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Part of the book series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science ((BSPS,volume 76))

Abstract

The role of valuation in scientific research has been widely discussed in the methodological and philosophical literature. The interest in the problem stems to a large extent from the concern that value-dependence would jeopardize the objectivity of science. This concern is clearly reflected, for example, in Max Weber’s influential writings on the subject.1

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© 1983 D. Reidel Publishing Company

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Hempel, C.G. (1983). Valuation and Objectivity in Science. In: Cohen, R.S., Laudan, L. (eds) Physics, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 76. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-7055-7_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-7055-7_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-009-7057-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-7055-7

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