Skip to main content

Part of the book series: Science and Philosophy ((SCPH,volume 1))

  • 167 Accesses

Abstract

Our historical analysis shows that the construction of the present concept of electromagnetic field took place in three periods, or phases, which I will call: (1) ‘heuristic guide’, (2) ‘elaborational’, and (3) ‘philosophical’. The contributions of Faraday and of Maxwell, until his third paper, come under phase (1); those of Maxwell, beginning with the third paper, and of Lorentz, under phase (2); and those of Einstein fall under phase (3). The reasons for these groupings and for the choice of name for each phase will become apparent as we discuss the relevant details that have emerged from the historical analysis.

The erratum of this chapter is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6187-6_16

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes

  1. See Gooding (1980a).

    Google Scholar 

  2. See note 21 of Part II.

    Google Scholar 

  3. There is an extensive philosophical literature on analogies in science. The most useful are Harré (1970), Hesse (1963), and North (1980). Only North addresses the role of analogies as “instruments of cognitive meaning” (his expression).

    Google Scholar 

  4. See, e.g., Osherson and Smith (1981), Rosch (1975), Rosch and Mervis (1975), and Smith and Median (1981).

    Google Scholar 

  5. For an interesting analysis of the problem of defining concepts, see Fodor et al. (1980). However, I disagree with Fodor’s own conclusion (Fodor, 1981) that, since we cannot ‘define’ concepts, all lexical concepts are unstructured and innate. See also, Smith and Median (1981).

    Google Scholar 

  6. Marovcsik (1981) has made a similar suggestion for concepts in general. Although I reject the essentialism of his view, his notion of an ‘Aitiational frame’ has influenced my notion of a ‘meaning schema’.

    Google Scholar 

  7. Shapere (1966) and (1982a).

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1984 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Nersessian, N.J. (1984). Meaning in scientific practice. In: Faraday to Einstein: Constructing Meaning in Scientific Theories. Science and Philosophy, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6187-6_10

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6187-6_10

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-0-7923-0950-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-6187-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics