Abstract
In her response to my “Seeing as a Non-Experiental Mental State: The Case from Synesthesia and Visual Imagery” Ophelia Deroy presents an argument for an interesting new account of synesthesia. On this account, synesthesia can be thought of as “a perceptual state (e.g. of a letter)” that is “changed or enriched by the incorporation of a conscious mental image (e.g. a color).” Deroy argues convincingly that Perky cases, in which the content of visual imagery is partially constituted by the content of perceptual experience, possibly are best understood as incorporated, or mixed, mental states (Deroy, Chap. 27, this volume; Perky 1910). But even if Perky cases are not truly mixed conscious states, Deroy argues, it is quite plausible that some of our mental states have perceptual as well as imagistic elements. Cases of synesthesia are good candidates to be exactly these kinds of mixed states.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Armel, K.C., and V.S. Ramachandran. 1999. Acquired synesthesia in retinitis pigmentosa. Neurocase 5: 293–296.
Auvray, M., and O. Deroy. 2013. How do synaesthetes experience the world? In Oxford handbook of philosophy of perception, ed. M. Matthen. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bor, D., J. Billington, and S. Baron-Cohen. 2007. Savant memory for digits in a case of synaesthesia and Asperger syndrome is related to hyperactivity in the lateral prefrontal cortex. Neurocase 13: 311–319.
Brogaard, B., S. Vanni, and J. Silvanto. 2012. Seeing mathematics: perceptual experience and brain activity in acquired synesthesia. Neurocase (in press)
Grossenbacher, P.G. 1997. Perception and sensory information in synaesthetic experience. In Synaesthesia: Classic and contemporary readings, ed. S. Baron-Cohen and J.E. Harrison, 148–172. Malden: Blackwell Publishers, Inc.
Grossenbacher, P.G., and C.T. Lovelace. 2001. Mechanisms of synesthesia: Cognitive and physiological constraints. Trends in Cognitive Science 5: 36–41.
Hubbard, E.M., S. Manohar, and V.S. Ramachandran. 2006. Contrast affects the strength of synesthetic colors. Cortex 42: 184–194.
Perky, C.W. 1910. An experimental study of imagination. The American Journal of Psychology 21: 422–452.
Ramachandran, V.S., and E.M. Hubbard. 2001a. Psychophysical investigations into the neural basis of synaesthesia. Proceedings of the Royal Society London B Biological Sciences 268: 979–983.
Ramachandran, V.S., and E.M. Hubbard. 2001b. Synaesthesia: A window into perception, thought and language. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8: 3–34.
Sinke, C., J.H. Halpern, M. Zedler, J. Neufeld, H.M. Emrich, and T. Passie. 2012. Genuine and drug-induced synesthesia: A comparison. Consciousness and Cognition 21(3): 1419–1434.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2014 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Brogaard, B. (2014). Varieties of Synesthetic Experience. In: Brown, R. (eds) Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience. Studies in Brain and Mind, vol 6. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6001-1_28
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6001-1_28
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-007-6000-4
Online ISBN: 978-94-007-6001-1
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)