Abstract
Two Chapters ago we met modal Meinongianism for the first time, and in the previous Chapter we have seen the theory formally developed via the tools of world semantics. It is now time to put the nonexistents of the third kind at work. To begin with, we will look at the modal Meinongian answers to the problems affecting naïve Meinongianism. We shall then examine a paradigmatic application of the theory: its treatment of the ontology and semantics of fictional discourse.
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Notes
- 1.
And we felicitously refer to it (at @) via the expression “the round square cupola of Berkeley College”, even though it is not round and square at @, for the reasons we have explored two Chapters ago: we felicitously refer to objects by means of descriptions objects may not satisfy at the actual world or at the current time; we tend to privilege salient features of the things we talk about, even when they don’t actually possess them, or don’t currently possess them.
- 2.
So phrased, Act does not correspond to the world-pointing use of “actually” taken as a modal indexical; Act has been so formulated for the sake of the argument. Sentences containing indexicals can express different contents in different contexts of use. In the standard Kaplanian treatment, to give their semantics we need a double indexing, taking into account not only worlds of evaluation, but also contexts of use. In the case of the indexical “actually”, the relevant contexts are worlds themselves: when embedded in an expression used at a world, “actually” picks out that very world. Used in the context of world w1, “It is actually the case that α” is true at w, iff α, as used at w1, is true at w1, and false otherwise. w1 = @ is a special case.
- 3.
An objection to this effect, directed against Priest’s Meinongian treatment of fictional objects, is in Sauchelli (2011).
- 4.
See Priest (2007), Section 3.3.
- 5.
Sainsbury (2010), p. 5.
- 6.
Ibid. Perhaps there’s some lesson in modal epistemology to be learned from this – though the following remark is just a tentative one. We can explore a priori the realm of possibilities (and impossibilities) via our representational faculties. We can represent objects as being such-and-such, and the (QCP) tells us a priori that there are circumstances at which things are as we conceive them. What we may not in general stipulate a priori is that what is conceived is possible, and, a fortiori, that it obtains. For any condition α[x], in the modal-Meinongian theory some object satisfies α[x] at some world w. What we may not stipulate a priori is that w is a possible world, and, a fortiori, that w = @. In David Lewis’ words, “what we do find out by observation is what possibilities we are: which worlds may be ours, which of their inhabitants may be ourselves” (Lewis 1986, p. 112). I am aware, though, that such claims may be vulnerable to counterexamples, for instance, from putative cases of a priori contingency.
- 7.
Salmon (1987), pp. 97–8.
- 8.
Not that this can be expressed in the formal L introduced in the previous Chapter, since it is a first-order language, whereas the condition embeds a quantification on properties. This is of minor importance for our purposes, though.
- 9.
See Priest (2005), pp. 44–5 and 87–8. As hinted at in the previous Chapter, Priest’s treatment of identity is based on a modal semantics with quantification on individual concepts, that is, functions from worlds to individuals. “w ||-+a = b”, in this setting, means that the individual concepts denoted by “a” and “b” output the same individual given input w. Each individual concept, c, maps each world in P and in I to the same individual @ is mapped to, i.e., for each w ∈ P ∪ I, c(w) = c(@). By so imposing, identity turns out to be necessary. Identities can nevertheless vary at impossible worlds in E, the extensionally impossible ones, which are accessible when intentional operators are involved. So even though a = b does entail □(a = b), that is, identicals are necessarily so, we can have that ®(a ≠ b): Hesperus is Phosphorus, and necessarily so, but the ancient Greeks could conceive Hesperus and Phosphorus to be distinct. Now I have not included the identity predicate as a designated predicate of our formal language L in the previous Chapter: as was claimed there, issues concerning the behavior of identity in intentional contexts are independent from the existential status of the involved objects, thus marginal for the purposes of this book. However, since we are talking of identity and identity criteria, it may be worth noting that the Substitutivity of Identicals can also fail in our simplified model, for conditions α[x] with x in the scope of our intentional ®. Suppose that Jack the Ripper, j, was, as a matter of fact, Prince Edward, e. I write a novel in which they are represented as distinct characters: Edward lives in Buckingham Palace, Jack lives in Wapping. It is represented that the Prince lives in the Palace. It is not represented that Jack does. So even if j = e, it can happen that α[x/j], but it is not the case that α[x/e], when the substitution is in the scope of ®. I owe to Graham Priest both the remark and the nice example.
- 10.
See Ibid, p. 89.
- 11.
In fact, in Priest’s account characterizations can be context-dependent and, in particular, dependent on speakers’ intentions, in a way that complicates matters when the (PF) gets applied (see Priest 2005, pp. 112–3). I shall not deal with this, though.
- 12.
See Ibid, pp. 89–90.
- 13.
- 14.
See van Inwagen (1977), p. 51.
- 15.
References
Inwagen P. van [1977], “Creatures of Fiction”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 14, pp. 299–308.
Lewis D.K. [1986], On the Plurality of Worlds, Blackwell, Oxford.
Priest G. [2005], Towards non-Being. The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality, Oxford U.P., Oxford.
Sainsbury M. [2010], Fiction and Fictionalism, Routledge, London & New York.
Salmon N. [1987], “Existence”, Philosophical Perspectives, 1, pp. 49–108.
Sauchelli A. [2011], “Fictional Objects, Non-Existence, and the Principle of Characterization”, Philosophical Studies (forthcoming).
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Berto, F. (2013). Nonexistents of the Third Kind at Work. In: Existence as a Real Property. Synthese Library, vol 356. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4207-9_8
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