The Union’s Institutional Reform and Enlargement

Abstract

It is a common view that the EU’s legislative capacity is threatened by continuous accessions from the original six to the present fifteen member states with modest reforms of the institutional framework (König and Schulz 1997). With about twelve applicant countries from Eastern and Southern Europe waiting to join the club, the forthcoming enlargement highlights these doubts about the effectiveness and legitimacy of European (EU) legislation. It is feared that further accessions, which would mean between 20 and 27 countries having to agree on Commission proposals, will dilute the Union’s legislative activities. In addition, member states like France and Germany have expressed their concerns that the entry of Eastern and Southern countries will change the existing balance between large and smaller member states. The accession of rather small and poor Eastern and Southern EU countries is supposed to allow for legislative coalitions excluding both large and rich member states. However, even though the Union has debated an institutional reform for a long time, there is little known about feasible solutions and their effects on legislative activities in a further enlarged Union.