Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Learning to Be Loyal. A Study of the Marseille Fish Market

  • Conference paper
Interaction and Market Structure

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ((LNE,volume 484))

Abstract

We study the wholesale fish market in Marseille. Two of the stylized facts of that market are high loyalty of buyers to sellers, and persistent price dispersion, although the same population of sellers and buyers meets in the same market hall on every day. We build a minimal model of adaptive agents. Sellers decide on quantities to supply, prices to ask, and how to treat loyal customers. Buyers decide which seller to visit, and which prices to accept. Learning takes place through reinforcement. We analyze the emergence of both stylized facts price dispersion and high loyalty. In a coevolutionary process, buyers learn to become loyal as sellers learn to offer higher utility to loyal buyers, while these sellers, in tum, learn to offer higher utility to loyal buyers as they happen to realize higher gross revenues from loyal buyers.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Burdett, K., & Judd, K (1983). Equilibrium Price Dispersion. Econometrica, 51,955–969.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bush, RR, & Mosteller, F. (1955). Stochastic Modelsfor Learning. New York: Wiley.

    Google Scholar 

  • Futia, CA. (1977). Excess Supply Equilibria. Journal of Economic Theory, 14,200–220.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gale, J., Binmore, K, & Samuelson, L. (1995). Learning to Be Imperfect: The Ultimatum Game. Games and Economic Behavior, 8, 56–90.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Graddy, K (1995). Testing for Imperfect Competition at the Fulton Fish Market. Rand Journal of Economics, 26, 75–92.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Güh, W., & Tietz, R (1990). Ultimatum Bargaining Behavior: A Survey and Comparison of Experimental Results. Journal of Economic Psychology, 11,417–440.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Härdle, W., & Kirman, A.P. (1995). Nonclassical Demand: A Model-Free Examination of Price-Quantity Relations in the Marseille Fish Market. Journal of Econometrics, 67, 227–257.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hopkins, E. (1995). Price Dispersion: an Evolutionary Approach (mimeo).

    Google Scholar 

  • Kirman, A.P., & McCarthy, M. (1990). Equilibrium Prices and Market Structure: The Marseille Fish Market.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kirman, A.P., & Vignes, A. (1991). Price-Dispersion: Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Evidence from the Marseille Fish Market. In KJ. Arrow (Ed.), Issues in Contemporary Economics: Proceedings of the Ninth World Congress of the International Economics Association, Athens, Greece. (Vol. 1. Markets and Welfare, pp. 160–185). London: MacMillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kirman, A.P., & Vriend, N.J. (1995). Evolving Market Structure: A Model of Price Dispersion and Loyalty (mimeo) Paper presented at the Workshop Economic ALife, Santa Fe Institute.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roth, A.E., & Erev, I. (1995). Learning in Extensive-Form Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Term. Games and Economic Behavior, 8, 164–212.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sarin, R, & Vahid, F. (1997). Payoff Assessments without Probabilities: A Simple Dynamic Model of Choice (mimeo).

    Google Scholar 

  • Sarin, R., & Vahid, F. (1998). Predicting How People Play Games: A Procedurally Rational Model of Choice (mimeo).

    Google Scholar 

  • Stahl, D.O. (1988). Bertrand Competition for Inputs and Walrasian Outcomes. American Economic Review, 78, 189–201.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stanley, E.A., Ashlock, D., & Tesfatsion, L. (1993). Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma with Choice and Refusal of Partners (ISU Economic Report No. 30) Iowa State University.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vignes, A. (1993). Dispersion de prix et marches dicentralisis: Ie cas du marche au poisson de Marseille (Ph.D. thesis) European University Institute, Florence.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vriend, N.J. (1995). Self-Organization of Markets: An Example of a Computational Approach. Computational Economics, 8, 205–231.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Weisbuch, G., Kinnan, A., & Herreiner, D. (1996). Market Organisation (mimeo).

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. E.H.E.S.S., GREQAM, Marseille, France

    Alan P. Kirman

  2. Dept. Economics, Queen Mary and Westfield College, University of London, Mile End Road, London, El 4NS, UK

    Nicolaas J. Vriend

Authors
  1. Alan P. Kirman
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Nicolaas J. Vriend
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Catholic University of Milan, ITEMQ, Largo Gemelli, 1, Milan, Italy, 20123

    Domenico Delli Gatti

  2. DSGSS, Viale Crucioli, 120, Teramo, Italy, 64100

    Mauro Gallegati

  3. EHESS, IUF, Université d‘Aix-Marseille III GREQAM, 2 Rue de la Charité, Marseille, France, 13002

    Alan Kirman

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2000 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Kirman, A.P., Vriend, N.J. (2000). Learning to Be Loyal. A Study of the Marseille Fish Market. In: Gatti, D.D., Gallegati, M., Kirman, A. (eds) Interaction and Market Structure. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 484. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-57005-6_3

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-57005-6_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-66979-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-57005-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation