Zusammenfassung
Menschen müssen ständig unterschiedlichste Situationen beurteilen oder Entscheidungen treffen. Dabei können die Informationen mehr oder weniger eindeutig und die Folgen der Entscheidung mehr oder weniger schwerwiegend sein. Die Psychologie erforscht die Struktur von Urteilen und Entscheidungen sowie Einflussfaktoren und Prozesse, die sowohl „gute“ als auch „irrationale“ Urteile und Entscheidungen hervorbringen. Die empirische Erforschung des Urteilens und Entscheidens hat faszinierende Einblicke in die einzelnen Bestandteile des Entscheidens gewährt, zum Bespiel über typische Fehlleistungen, verwendete Strategien der Suche nach relevanter Information sowie über deren weitere Verarbeitung. Spannende Befunde und die daraus entwickelten psychologischen Theorien des Urteilens und Entscheidens werden in diesem Kapitel vorgestellt.
Schlüsselwörter: Urteilen; Entscheiden; Informationsverarbeitung; Rationalität; Heuristik; Täuschungen; Strategie
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Bröder, A., Hilbig, B.E. (2017). Urteilen und Entscheiden. In: Müsseler, J., Rieger, M. (eds) Allgemeine Psychologie. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-53898-8_17
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