Abstract
A group key exchange (GKE) protocol enables users to set up a common secret key to be used later. There are three major security definitions regarding GKE: authenticated key exchange (AKE-security), mutual authentication (MA-security) and contributiveness. In this paper, we propose a stronger model in which both internal state and ephemeral key leakage is considered in different exposure levels. On the other hand, we demonstrate the previous definition on contributiveness is weak, and cannot provide necessary security guarantees. As a solution, we give a stronger definition for contributiveness that is suitable in most interesting cases. We then present an efficient GKE protocol secure in our stronger model. Finally, as an independent interest, we revisit the security of a previous GKE protocol (BGS + ), showing it fails to provide the desirable security requirement defined in its own model.
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Chen, C., Guo, Y., Zhang, R. (2013). Group Key Exchange Resilient to Leakage of Ephemeral Secret Keys with Strong Contributiveness. In: De Capitani di Vimercati, S., Mitchell, C. (eds) Public Key Infrastructures, Services and Applications. EuroPKI 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7868. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40012-4_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40012-4_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-40011-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-40012-4
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