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International Conference on E-Voting and Identity

Vote-ID 2011: E-Voting and Identity pp 122–139Cite as

Single Layer Optical-Scan Voting with Fully Distributed Trust

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 7187))

Abstract

We present a new approach for cryptographic end-to-end verifiable optical-scan voting. Ours is the first that does not rely on a single point of trust to protect ballot secrecy while simultaneously offering a conventional single layer ballot form and unencrypted paper trail. We present two systems following this approach. The first system uses ballots with randomized confirmation codes and a physical in-person dispute resolution procedure. The second system improves upon the first by offering an informational dispute resolution procedure and a public paper audit trail through the use of self-blanking invisible ink confirmation codes. We then present a security analysis of the improved system.

Full version available: http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/568

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Cheriton School of Computer Science, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada, N2L 2G1

    Aleksander Essex & Urs Hengartner

  2. Institut für Kryptographie and Sicherheit/EISS, Kahrlsruhe Institute of Technology, 76128, Karlsruhe, Germany

    Christian Henrich

Authors
  1. Aleksander Essex
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  2. Christian Henrich
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  3. Urs Hengartner
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Informatics and Telecommunications, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, 15784, Panepistimiopolis, Athens, Greece

    Aggelos Kiayias

  2. Institute of Computer Science, University of Tartu, J. Liivi 2, 50409, Tartu, Estonia

    Helger Lipmaa

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© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Essex, A., Henrich, C., Hengartner, U. (2012). Single Layer Optical-Scan Voting with Fully Distributed Trust. In: Kiayias, A., Lipmaa, H. (eds) E-Voting and Identity. Vote-ID 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7187. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32747-6_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32747-6_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-32746-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-32747-6

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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