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Strong, Independent, and Effective: The European Union’s Promotion of the International Criminal Court

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Abstract

The European Union has profiled itself as a staunch supporter of the ICC. This chapter provides an overview of the EU’s campaign for the ICC and seeks to explain why and how the EU supports the ICC? I argue that the EU has a special interest in the ICC, because it offers the EU a framework to oppose unilateralist policies of the US. Given that the Bush administration ferociously opposed the ICC, I argue that the EU has engaged in what I call “normative binding” in its global campaign for the ratification of the Rome Statute. Since the EU cannot compete with the US on military terms, an international system based on restrictive norms is important for increasing its power. By drawing the US into a debate over international norms, the EU may be able to build up its soft power by signaling an alternative concept of multilateral order to the rest of the world. Thus, the promotion of international legal institutions has implications for the international system by enabling normative binding. The EU’s policy towards the ICC forms the heart of the paper as I discuss the EU’s role in the establishment and promotion of the ICC and contrast it to the opposing US policy.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For an excellent introduction to the ICC and the RS, see Schabas 2011.

  2. 2.

    Washburn 1999, p. 368; Kaul 1998a, b, p. 52; Scheffer 2012, pp. 18–9; A/AC.249/1998/DP.2; A/C.6/51/SR.29.

  3. 3.

    Wendt 1992, pp. 399, 417; see also March and Olsen 1998, pp. 951–2; Deitelhoff 2009, pp. 43–5, Kratochwil 1989.

  4. 4.

    This chapter does not engage in the debate on the nature of the EU’s power. However, for the discussion on civilian and normative power Europe, see Duchêne 1973; Maull 1990; Manners 2002; Smith 2005; Diez and Manners 2007; Forsberg 2011.

  5. 5.

    A/C.6/50/SR.25; A/C.6/51/SR.26; COM (95), 567; EP OJ C 126, 0015.

  6. 6.

    Washburn 1999, p. 368; Kaul 1998b, p. 52; Scheffer 2012, pp. 18–9; Kaul 4.8.1997; A/AC.249/1998/DP.2; A/C.6/51/SR.29.

  7. 7.

    Scheffer 13.11.1997; A/CN.4/458 and Add. 1–8, 85; A/CN.4/L.488. For the overall agenda of the US in the Rome conference, see: United States Delegation 26.3.1996; Scheffer 1999a, p. 19; United States Delegation 23.3.1998; A/C.6/50/SR.27; A/C.6/52/SR.13.

  8. 8.

    Washburn 1999, 367; A/CONF.183/ 13 (Vol. II), 73; Kirsch and Holmes 1999, 4–5.

  9. 9.

    A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.42; A/CONF.183/SR.9; Scheffer 2012, pp. 222–4.

  10. 10.

    A/CONF.183/2; Lee 2002, 9; A/C.6/51/SR.27; A/AC.249/CRP.l/Rev.l; A/Res. 51/207; A/Res. 52/160.

  11. 11.

    Grossman 6.5.2002; A/C.6/59/SR.27; Cummins and Stewart 2003, pp. 151–3.

  12. 12.

    S/Res.1422; S/PV.4563; S/PV.4568; Draft Resolution S/2002/712; Cummins and Stewart 2003, p. 157; The UNSC renewed the Resolution 1422 12.6.2003 with S/RES/1487 (France, Germany, and Syria abstained), but in 2004, the US failed to gain support for a second renewal. See: Cunningham 22.6.2004; Department of State 23.6.2004.

  13. 13.

    U.S. Congress H.R.4775; Scheffer 2001–2002, pp. 48–9; Franck and Yuhan 2003, p. 532.

  14. 14.

    H.R. 4818; CICC Quotes; CICC Summary; CICC, Countries Opposed; Ribando 2007, p. 5; Amupadhi 31.7.2003; Kristof 16.10.2005; HRW, 30.6.2003; Bolton 3.11.2003; Reeker 13.8.2002.

  15. 15.

    For a thorough discussion on the common policy formation of the EU, see Thomas 2009 and Thomas 2012.

  16. 16.

    CEU 12134/02; EP 25.9.2002; Thomas 2009; Amnesty International, 11.10.2002; EP P_5TA(2002)0449.

  17. 17.

    91 % of European countries have ratified the RS, while 80 % American, 63 % African, and only 33 % Asian and Oceania countries have joined the ICC. See United Nations Treaty Collection; United Nations Statistics Division.

  18. 18.

    General Secretariat of the Council 2008, p. 16; European Commission 2008.

  19. 19.

    A/RES/58/318; A/C.6/59/SR.6; A/C.6/59/SR.27; A/RES/58/79; A/C.6/58/SR.9; A/C.6/58/SR.10; A/C.6/58/SR.13.

  20. 20.

    Art. 13 and 14, Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the European Union on cooperation and assistance.

  21. 21.

    The US abstained in the voting. SeeA/Res/1593; SC/8351; Cryer 2006.

  22. 22.

    HRW 8.2.2005; Kristof 2.2.2005; Ralph 2007, pp. 175, 176–8; Power 10.2.2005.

  23. 23.

    Koh 2010. For countries that have signed a BIA with the US, see Georgetown Law Library, International Criminal Court—Article 98 Agreements Research Guide.

  24. 24.

    CEU 2011/168/CFSP; see also CEU 5731/10, 24; CEU 17218/09; CEU 16841/09.

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  1. Department of Political and Economic Studies, University of Helsinki, Arkadiankatu 7, 17, 00014, Helsinki, Finland

    Salla Garský

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  1. , European Union Center, University of Miami, Memorial Drive 1000, Coral Gables, 33146, Florida, USA

    Astrid Boening

  2. Center for Global Studies, Institute for Political Science, Bonn University, Walter-Flex Str. 3, Bonn, 53113, Germany

    Jan-Frederik Kremer

  3. , Chair for International Politcs, Ruhr University Bochum, Universitätsstraße 150, Bochum, 44780, Germany

    Aukje van Loon

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Garský, S. (2013). Strong, Independent, and Effective: The European Union’s Promotion of the International Criminal Court. In: Boening, A., Kremer, JF., van Loon, A. (eds) Global Power Europe - Vol. 2. Global Power Shift. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32416-1_1

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