Definition
Stapledon (1996) defines institutional monitoring as “any form of involvement, direct or indirect, at firm level or industry-wide, by institutions in corporate governance.” This implies that monitoring may (a) include direct action by an institution or through an intermediary and (b) be targeted at companies and/or industries. Monitoring may include information acquisition, voting, engagement, and more active intervention and is often used synonymously with “shareholder activism,” “active investing,” and relationship investing (Maug 1998; Yaron 2005; Hawley and Williams 1996).
Introduction
The Combined Code and other widely referenced corporate governance codes of conduct and guidelines emphasize the importance of institutional shareholders in influencing corporate governance compliance by the companies in which they have invested. In particular, these shareholders are expected...
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Lynn, T. (2013). Institutional Investor Monitoring. In: Idowu, S.O., Capaldi, N., Zu, L., Gupta, A.D. (eds) Encyclopedia of Corporate Social Responsibility. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28036-8_224
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