Abstract
Auctions have become enormously popular in recent years. A typical example is spectrum auction for distributions of licenses for electromagnetic spectrum based on simultaneous ascending-price auction. Even though this auction is popular, it is not robust against some strategic manipulations of buyers. While allowing buyers to submit alternative choices (due dates in this paper) in XOR bids, we propose a new auction mechanism called simultaneous ascending-price auction with option proposal (SAA-OP). One of the important characteristics of this mechanism is that there are two types of auction winners: an auctioneer chooses winners (exact fulfillments) or buyers take options proposed by the auctioneer (partial fulfillments). Due to this characteristic, the proposing mechanism implements an ex-post efficient equilibrium.
This material is based upon work supported by Innovation Creation Project of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology-Japan while serving at Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology.
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Furuhata, M. (2012). A Robust Multi-unit Ascending-Price Auction with Complementarities against Strategic Manipulation. In: Desai, N., Liu, A., Winikoff, M. (eds) Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems. PRIMA 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 7057. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25920-3_22
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25920-3_22
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-25919-7
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