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International Conference on Information Security

ISC 2011: Information Security pp 47–62Cite as

A Formal Approach to Distance-Bounding RFID Protocols

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 7001))

Abstract

Distance-bounding protocols aim at impeding man-in-themiddle( MITM) attacks by measuring response times. Three kinds of attacks are usually addressed: (1) Mafia attacks where adversaries relay communication between honest prover and honest verifier in different sessions; (2) Terrorist attacks where adversaries gets limited active support from the prover to impersonate; (3) Distance attacks where a malicious prover claims to be closer to the verifier than it really is. Many protocols in the literature address one or two such threats, but no rigorous security models —nor clean proofs— exist so far. For resource-constrained RFID tags, distance-bounding is more difficult to achieve. Our contribution here is to formally define security against the above-mentioned attacks and to relate the properties. We thus refute previous beliefs about relations between the notions, showing instead that they are independent. Finally we assess the security of the RFID distance-bounding scheme due to Kim and Avoine in our model, and enhance it to include impersonation security and allow for errors due to noisy channel transmissions.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Darmstadt University of Technology & CASED, Germany

    Marc Fischlin & Cristina Onete

  2. Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology (SIT) and CASED, Germany

    Ulrich Dürholz & Michael Kasper

Authors
  1. Ulrich Dürholz
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  2. Marc Fischlin
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  3. Michael Kasper
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  4. Cristina Onete
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, 800 Dongchuan Road, 200240, Min Hang Shanghai, China

    Xuejia Lai

  2. Cryptography and Security Department, Institute for Infocomm Research, Singapore

    Jianying Zhou

  3. Key Laboratory of Computer Networks and Information, Security Xidian University, 2 South Taibai Road, Xi’an, 710071, Shaanxi, China

    Hui Li

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© 2011 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Dürholz, U., Fischlin, M., Kasper, M., Onete, C. (2011). A Formal Approach to Distance-Bounding RFID Protocols. In: Lai, X., Zhou, J., Li, H. (eds) Information Security. ISC 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7001. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24861-0_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24861-0_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-24860-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-24861-0

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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