Abstract
Combinatorial exchanges have attracted much attention recently. However, to this point there is no generally accepted payment allocation algorithm capable of clearing combinatorial exchanges. The Vickrey-Groves-Clarke mechanism, which has been successfully applied in the case of one-sided combinatorial auctions, is not budget-balanced when generalized to two-sided auctions. We present a new model for an auction market with autonomous traders and conjunctive combinatorial bids that allows formulation of some fairness properties applicable when pricing is based solely on the buyer’s bids. We then give an example payment allocation algorithm that implements these properties.
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Tanner, A., Mühl, G. (2003). A Combinatorial Exchange for Autonomous Traders. In: Bauknecht, K., Tjoa, A.M., Quirchmayr, G. (eds) E-Commerce and Web Technologies. EC-Web 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2738. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45229-4_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45229-4_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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