Abstract
Schopenhauer positions himself squarely within the tradition of Kant’s transcendental idealism , and his first sense of the metaphysical comprises the synthetic cognition a priori that makes experience possible. This is Schopenhauer’s transcendental metaphysics. As he developed philosophically however, Schopenhauer devised a second sense of the metaphysical. This second sense also depends, albeit negatively, on transcendental idealism because its central claim—that the thing in itself should be identified with will—looks like precisely a species of transcendent metaphysics, a claim that goes beyond the possibility of experience into the cognitively forbidden realm of things in themselves. I shall argue however that this second sense of the metaphysical can be formulated much more independently of transcendental idealism , following a recent similar interpretation of Kant due to Rae Langton, and that this makes for some surprising connections to contemporary metaphysics.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2017 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Welchman, A. (2017). Schopenhauer’s Two Metaphysics: Transcendental and Transcendent. In: Shapshay, S. (eds) The Palgrave Schopenhauer Handbook. Palgrave Handbooks in German Idealism. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62947-6_7
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62947-6_7
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-62946-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-62947-6
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)