Abstract
In this chapter we assess the explanatory utility of ascriptions of technical functions by considering two explanation-seeking contexts that often figure in the philosophical literature on functions (and explanations). Applied to the technical domain, these are: (i) why was artifact x produced?, and (ii) why does artifact x not have the expected capacity to ϕ? We argue that function ascriptions are explanatorily irrelevant for the first explanation-seeking question, and are explanatorily relevant for the second one. We argue these points in terms of the desideratum that explanations should only list difference making factors.
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Note that this desideratum is different from the theory or model constraint of ‘simplicity’. When endorsing ‘simplicity’ a theorist or modeler may intentionally exclude reference to factors that make a difference to whether or not a phenomenon occurs. The constraint which we endorse here, requires that an agent should strive for describing all the factors that make a difference to whether or not a phenomenon occurs. Whether an agent succeeds in doing so is, of course, a different matter. Weisberg (2007) labels this constraint an “1-causal” representational ideal, and distinguishes it from the representational ideals of “simplicity” and “completeness”. The latter requires that an explanation should specify both difference making properties with respect to whether or not a phenomenon occurs, as well as the “higher order causal factors” that affect the precise manner in which the phenomenon occurs (cf. Weisberg 2007, p. 651).
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An astute reader may point out that (justified) function ascription could have played no role in answering the first explanation-seeking question since there was no physical artifact yet to which a designer could have ascribed a function to. Agreed, yet our answer is in keeping with the ICE theory: “The historical perspective required to ascribe ICE functions may be limited to the design process; it need not extend to earlier generations of artefacts. An artefact can therefore straightaway be ascribed the capacity for which designers selected it, even if the artefact is a completely novel one (the case of the first nuclear plant)” (Houkes and Vermaas 2010, p. 93) (our italics). In other words, the answer accords with the ICE theory. To be sure, we here take function ascriptions as answers to the explanation-seeking question under consideration to be ‘proper’ function ascriptions. Proper function ascriptions are discussed by Houkes and Vermaas (2010) against the backdrop of what they call ‘proper use plans’.
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An astute reader may also point out that regarding production, belief initially is sufficient and justified belief only becomes relevant in continuation of the production process. Again, agreed. However, justified belief is central to the ICE theory, both in the ascriptions of functions to technical artifacts, and in accommodating central desiderata put forward in the function literature, such as the proper-accidental function distinction, function ascription in innovative contexts, and the handling of malfunction statements. The underlying reason is that the ICE theory is a “normative rather than a descriptive perspective” on “justifiable function ascriptions” (Houkes and Vermaas 2010, p. 4). Given this perspective, the requirement of justified belief for explaining the production of an artifact is either a bullet one has to bite when adopting the ICE theory, or the ICE theory should be extended to also encompass a descriptive perspective in which ‘mere belief’ suffices for explaining the production of an artifact. Hence, our use of the term ‘justified’.
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We focus on those difference making factors that are part of the conceptual framework of the ICE theory, and do not consider other potential difference making factors, such as, say, the choice of materials for the computer mouse. Therefore, our labelling of the notion that explanations should specify difference-making factors as a desideratum (cf. note 3). That there are, in the explanatory context under consideration, other difference making factors does not affect the outcome of our comparison of the explanatory superiority of functional vis-à-vis teleological explanations.
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Note that the argumentation presented here is not to be confused with conceptual explication of the term ‘technical function’. On the ICE account, ‘technical function’ refers to a physical-chemical capacity. We here invoke the ICE function ascription machinery to construct two parallel explanations.
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Varieties of this general question-format are for instance: ‘why does component x function suboptimal?’ (cf. Otto and Wood 2001)?; ‘why is this unexpected and undesired behavior present?’; ‘which malfunction is responsible for the undesired behavior?’; ‘which components/module does not work as expected?’ (cf. Goel and Chandrasekaran 1989; Bell et al. 2007); ‘does the trigger of the function fail and/or its effect?’ (Bell et al. 2007).
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The explanation might also list some further ‘local details’ that enable understanding how specific features make a difference to a specific malfunction. For instance, oil leaking into the hot exhaust due to a rupture in the oil reservoir may cause a car to expel thick black smoke. One can imagine that some further details are relevant to understand this malfunction, say, the exhaust function of expelling (normal amounts of) smoke and the carburetor producing sparks, since sparking is a cause of both expulsion of normal and excess amounts of smoke. More on this ‘enrichment’ of malfunction explanations with specific mechanism details in Chap. 2.
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Malfunction explanations already require various assumptions about the structure of a system, of course: a lot of structural and behavioral knowledge is involved (cf. Goel and Chandrasekaran 1989; Bell et al. 2007). This knowledge serves as backdrop against which to assess which features are explanatorily relevant and thus get referred to in the function descriptions.
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Triggers are inputs for main or primary normal functions and provide ‘pointers’ to possible malfunctions (as will become clear later on). Triggers are thus different from ‘control functions’ which are intended to counteract unwanted disturbances and unwanted changes in engineering systems (cf. Lind 1994).
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van Eck, D., Weber, E. (2016). Assessing the Explanatory Relevance of Ascriptions of Technical Functions. In: The Philosophy of Science and Engineering Design. SpringerBriefs in Philosophy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-35155-1_1
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