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Biology and Evolutionary Games

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Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory

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Abstract

This chapter surveys some evolutionary games used in biological sciences. These include the Hawk–Dove game, the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Rock–Paper–Scissors, the war of attrition, the Habitat Selection game, predator–prey games, and signaling games.

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Acknowledgements

This project has received funding from the European Union Horizon 2020 research and innovation programe under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement No 690817. VK acknowledges support provided by the Institute of Entomology (RVO:60077344).

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Mathematics, City, University London, London, UK

    Mark Broom

  2. Biology Center, Czech Academy of Sciences, České Budějovice, Czech Republic

    Vlastimil Křivan

  3. Faculty of Science, University of South Bohemia, České Budějovice, Czech Republic

    Vlastimil Křivan

Authors
  1. Mark Broom
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  2. Vlastimil Křivan
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Mark Broom .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Advanced Study, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, Illinois, USA

    Tamer Basar

  2. GERAD, HEC Montréal, Montreal, Québec, Canada

    Georges Zaccour

Section Editor information

  1. Coordinated Science Laboratory, University of Illinois, 1308 West Main, 61801, Urbana, Illinois, USA

    Tamer Basar

  2. Département de sciences de la décision, HEC Montreal, Montreal, Canada

    Georges Zaccour

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Broom, M., Křivan, V. (2016). Biology and Evolutionary Games. In: Basar, T., Zaccour, G. (eds) Handbook of Dynamic Game Theory. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27335-8_31-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27335-8_31-1

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