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Provably Improving Election Verifiability in Belenios

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Electronic Voting (E-Vote-ID 2021)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 12900))

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Abstract

Belenios is an online voting system that provides a strong notion of election verifiability, where no single party has to be trusted, and security holds as soon as either the voting registrar or the voting server is honest. It was formally proved to be secure, making the assumption that no further ballots are cast on the bulletin board after voters verified their ballots. In practice, however, revoting is allowed and voters can verify their ballots anytime. This gap between formal proofs and use in practice leaves open space for attacks, as has been shown recently. In this paper we make two simple additions to Belenios and we formally prove that the new version satisfies the expected verifiability properties. Our proofs are automatically performed with the Tamarin prover, under the assumption that voters are allowed to vote at most four times.

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Acknowledgement

This work was supported by the Luxembourg National Research Fund (FNR) and the Research Council of Norway for the joint INTER project SURCVS (No. 11747298).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. SnT, University of Luxembourg, Esch-sur-Alzette, Luxembourg

    Sevdenur Baloglu & Sergiu Bursuc

  2. DCS, University of Luxembourg, Esch-sur-Alzette, Luxembourg

    Sjouke Mauw & Jun Pang

Authors
  1. Sevdenur Baloglu
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  2. Sergiu Bursuc
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  3. Sjouke Mauw
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  4. Jun Pang
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Sevdenur Baloglu .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia

    Robert Krimmer

  2. Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Karlsruhe, Germany

    Melanie Volkamer

  3. Kozminski University, Warsaw, Poland

    David Duenas-Cid

  4. University of Copenhagen, København, Denmark

    Oksana Kulyk

  5. University of Luxembourg, Esch-sur-Alzette, Luxembourg

    Peter Rønne

  6. University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia

    Mihkel Solvak

  7. University of Bath, Bath, UK

    Micha Germann

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Baloglu, S., Bursuc, S., Mauw, S., Pang, J. (2021). Provably Improving Election Verifiability in Belenios. In: Krimmer, R., et al. Electronic Voting. E-Vote-ID 2021. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 12900. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86942-7_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-86942-7_1

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-030-86941-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-030-86942-7

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