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Freedom, Rationality, and Responsibility

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The Conceptual Foundation of Morality

Part of the book series: Philosophical Studies Series ((PSSP,volume 145))

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Abstract

In this chapter I refute skepticism about freedom of the will. I explain how the rationalist moral theory developed earlier in this book gives meaning to the idea of freedom in a deterministic world, by explicating it in terms of rationality. My analysis also sheds light on the notions of responsibility and punishment, which are an essential part of any normative theory of conduct. The conclusions of this chapter are that freedom is compatible with determinism, and that freedom, morality, and rationality are interdependent. A (perfectly) rational agent is also a moral and a free agent.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of B.A. in Liberal Arts and Sciences, The Sapir Academic College, Sha’ar HaNegev, Israel

    Gal Yehezkel

  2. Department of History, Philosophy, and Judaic Studies, The Open University of Israel, Ranaana, Israel

    Gal Yehezkel

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  1. Gal Yehezkel
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Yehezkel, G. (2022). Freedom, Rationality, and Responsibility. In: The Conceptual Foundation of Morality. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 145. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-80583-8_5

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