Abstract
In this chapter I outline a rationalist theory of agency. I begin with a minimalist conception of reason, according to which reason only serves an instrumental role. I argue that the use of reason is a necessary condition for determining ends, and thus for agency. Hence, every agent is a rational agent. Furthermore, reason sets a demand that every agent ought to follow, which is to act rationally. This conclusion implies that the end of rational agency ought to be gaining knowledge of reality. Finally, I explain the implications of this conclusion regarding the place of desires and the search for happiness in practical reasoning, and identify happiness with a rational mental state, that is, a state of mind that is directed toward gaining knowledge of reality.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
References
Aristotle. 2004. Nicomachean Ethics. Ed. and Trans. Roger Crisp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Broome, John. 2013. Rationality through Reasoning. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Davidson, Donald. 1963. Actions, Reasons and Causes. Journal of Philosophy 60: 685–700.
Fix, David J. 2018. Intellectual Isolation. Mind 127 (506): 491–520.
Gewirth, Alan. 1981. The Future of Ethics: The Moral Powers of Reason. Nous 15 (1): 15–30.
Hubin, Donald C. 2001. The Groundless Normativity of Instrumental Rationality. The Journal of Philosophy 98 (9): 445–468.
Kant, Immanuel. 1997. Critique of Practical Reason. Ed. And trans. Mary Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 1998. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Ed. And trans. Mary Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kolodny, Niko. 2005. Why be rational. Mind 114 (455): 509–563.
Korsgaard, Christine. 1986. Skepticism about Practical Reason. The Journal of Philosophy 83 (1): 5–25.
———. 2008. The Constitution of Agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Malcolm, Norman. 1958. Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir. Oxford University Press.
Millgram, Elijah. 2008. Specificationism. In Reasoning, ed. Jonathan J. Adler and Lance J. Rips, 731–747. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
O’Neill, Onora. 1989. Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant’s Practical Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Singer, Peter. 1993. How Are We to Live? Melbourne: Text Publishing.
Titelbaum, Michael G. 2015. Rationality’s Fixed Point. In Oxford Studies in Epistemology Vol. 5, ed. Tamar S. Gendler and John Hawthorne, 253–294. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Yehezkel, Gal. 2014. The Conceptual Structure of Reality. New-York: Springer.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2022 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Yehezkel, G. (2022). The End of Rational Agency. In: The Conceptual Foundation of Morality. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 145. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-80583-8_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-80583-8_3
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-80582-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-80583-8
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)