Confidentiality of Attorney-Client Communications in the United States

Thaman, Stephen C.

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-43123-5_14

Stephen C. Thaman¹⁵

Part of the book series: Ius Comparatum - Global Studies in Comparative Law ((GSCL,volume 44))

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Abstract

This chapter first outlines the extent of the right to counsel in criminal cases in the United States, that is, when it is first recognized, the types of cases where appointed counsel is mandatory etc. It then delves into limitations on the ability to meet with and confidentially speak with defense counsel placed on incarcerated defendants and during trial with respect to all defendants. Finally, it explores the extent to which law enforcement authorities may search attorney’s offices, or intercept confidential oral or electronic communications between attorney and client, or access them in digital storage after the communication. Important in this respect are the relatively strict exclusionary rules in the United States when law enforcement investigators violate the right to confidentiality of lawyer-client relations protected by the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution or the laws relating to the right to counsel and attorney-client privilege.

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Notes

1.
The Bill of Rights are the first ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution, adopted in 1791, 4 years after the constitution itself was adopted in 1787.
2.
Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 209–10 (1935).
3.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 65 (1932).
4.
Israel (1963), p. 267.
5.
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462–63 (1938).
6.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–42 (1963).
7.
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
8.
Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662 (2002).
9.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 669, 687 (1984).
10.
Thaman (2000), p. 1017.
11.
Ibid. p. 1018.
12.
Ibid.
13.
Ibid. pp. 1020–1021.
14.
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689–90 (1972).
15.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
16.
County of Riverside, California v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991).
17.
Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 194 (2008).
18.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 58–59 (1932).
19.
28 C.F.R. § 501.3(a) (1997).
20.
United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2009).
21.
Thaman (2001), pp. 583–584.
22.
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949).
23.
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 324–27 (1959).
24.
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964).
25.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486, 444–45 (1966).
26.
Ibid. p. 474.
27.
Duckworth v. Eagan, 442 U.S. 195 201–04 (1989).
28.
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 431 (1986).
29.
State v. Joslin 29 P.3d 1112, 1118–20 (Or. 2001) (and police must not question suspect if lawyer invokes suspect’s right to silence); State v. Roache, 803 A.2d 572, 578–79 (NH 2002) (no duty to heed counsel’s request not to question the suspect, as long as suspect knows counsel has been appointed); Commonwealth v. McNulty, 937 N.E.2d 16, 25–28 (Mass. 2010); State v. McAdams, 193 So.3d 824, 832 (Fla. 2016).
30.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486, p. 536.
31.
Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 299 (1990).
32.
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990).
33.
Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 683–85 (1988).
34.
Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 110–12 (2010).
35.
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 203–05 (1964).
36.
Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519, 524–25 (2004). It should be recalled that the Miranda warnings need not be given to uncharged suspects when they are out of custody.
37.
Patterson v. Illinois, 487 US 285, 290–95 (l988).
38.
Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 789–95 (2009).
39.
People v. Samuels, 400 N.E.2d 1344, 1346–47 (N.Y. 1980) (holding that an arrest warrant triggers the right to counsel, and that a person arrested on such a warrant may not be interviewed without counsel being present).
40.
People v. Settles, 385 N.E.2d 6l2, 616 (N.Y. l978); Bradford v. State, 927 S.W.2d 329, 334–35 (Ark. 1996); State v. Forbush, 796 N.W.2d 741, 748–50 (Wis. 2011) (but only if defendant has invoked the right to counsel); State v. Lawson, 297 P.3d 1164, 1173–74 (Kan. 2013) (Miranda waiver of counsel is insufficient after charging); State v. Bevel, 745 S.E.2d 237, 242–43 (W.Va. 2013).
41.
United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 269–70 (l980); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986).
42.
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 180–81 (1991). New York does not follow this rule. People v. Lopez, 947 N.E.2d 1155, 1156 (N.Y. 2011).
43.
Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 168–69 (2001). Some States have refused to follow the holding of Cobb. State v. Conway, 842 N.E.2d 996, 1017–18 (Ohio 2006); Jewell v. State, 957 N.E.2d 625, 635–36 (Ind. 2011).
44.
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236–37 (1967).
45.
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689–90 (1972).
46.
United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 317–18 (1973).
47.
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 227–28. A Vermont statute, however, requires a lawyer to be present when a drunk-driving suspect is advised of the necessity of submitting to a test of his blood alcohol, because refusal is punished as a crime. State v. Velez, 819 A.2d 712, 716–17 (Vt. 2003).
48.
People v. Smith, 92 N.E.3d 789, 790 (N.Y. 2017).
49.
The grand jury is an inquisitorial panel of lay people supervised by the prosecutor, which has the power to subpoena witnesses, investigate charges, and decide whether there is sufficient evidence for a case to be charged. The right to be charged by grand jury is guaranteed by the 5th Amend. in federal cases, but is not required in all states. United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2005).
50.
Connecticut v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 292–93 (1999).
51.
La Fave et al. (2018), 3:8.14b.
52.
United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 574–75 (1976).
53.
Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 135 (1967).
54.
McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687–88 (1894).
55.
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357–58 (1963).
56.
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974).
57.
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555–56 (1987).
58.
Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989); Gibson v. Turpin, 513 S.E.2d 186, 187–88 (Ga. 1999).
59.
Kargus v. State, 162 P.3d 818, 821–22 (Kan. 2007).
60.
21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B); Hain v. Mullin, 436 F.3d 1168, 1170–71 (10th Cir. 2006); Grayson v. State, 118 So.3d 118, 126–27 (Miss. 2013).
61.
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835–36 (1975).
62.
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S.389, 396–97 (1993).
63.
Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 177–78 (2008).
64.
Pitts v. Redman, 776 F.Supp. 907, 922 (D. Del. 1991).
65.
Stubbs v. Bordenkircher, 689 F.2d 1205, 1206 (4th Cir. 1982).
66.
Unites States v. Sandoval-Mendoza, 472 F.3d 645, 651–52 (9th Cir. 2006); Moore v. Purkett, 275 F.3d 685, 688–89 (8th Cir. 2001).
67.
Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 283–85 (1989).
68.
Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 88–89 (1976).
69.
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
70.
Matter of Nackson, 534 A.2d 65, 69 (N.J. App. 1987).
71.
Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998).
72.
Cal. Business and Professions Code § 6068(e). Cf. Hall (2017), §28.10.
73.
Wigmore (1904). Cited in Cunningham and Srader (2017), pp. 318–319.
74.
Green (1996), p. 463.
75.
American Law Institute, Restatement, Third, The Law Governing Lawyers, 1986–2017, available at https://www.ali.org/publications/show/law-governing-lawyers/.
76.
Wigmore (1904), § 2290. For similar language, see Restatement 1986–2017, § 86.
77.
United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F.Supp. 357, 358–59 (D. Mass. 1950). Cf. Hall (2017), § 29:2.
78.
Uniform Rules of Evidence (URE) 1974, Rule 502(d)(1). ABA Model Rule 1.2(d) also states that “(a) lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent.” This exception was already recognized in Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 14 (1933).
79.
Unites States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 574–75 (1989).
80.
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389–90 (1981). Cf. Brown (2006), p. 925. See also URE 502(a)(1).
81.
On “work product,” see the section ‘Discovery and “Work Product”’ below.
82.
This test was first promulgated in Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Pa. 1962). See Brown (2006), pp. 926–927.
83.
This test was first enunciated in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491–92 (7th Cir. 1970). Brown (2006), pp. 928–929.
84.
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 391–93 (1981).
85.
Brown (2006), p. 934.
86.
This provision has been codified in New York. Hall (2017), § 28:11.
87.
Texas RPC 1.05(a); Hall (2017), §§ 28:12, 28:14.
88.
ABA Rule 1.6(a); Cf. Cal. Rule 3-100(A). Such as in negotiations with the prosecutor to prevent charges from being filed or to secure an advantageous plea bargain. Hall (2017), § 28:19.
89.
ABA Rule 1.6(b); ABA Code 4-101(C) also uses the phrase: “may reveal”.
90.
United States v. Pinson, 584 F.3d 972, 977–78 (10th Cir. 2009).
91.
ABA Rule 1.6(b)(5); ABA Code 4-101(C)(4); Restatement, § 64; Hall (2017), § 28:59.
92.
Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 609–13 (1972).
93.
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 81–84 (1970).
94.
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16. For an excellent compendium of the change to prosecution discovery, see Mosteller (1986).
95.
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
96.
People v. Zamudio, 181 P.3d 105, 128–29 (Cal. 2008).
97.
United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 245–46 (1975).
98.
Mosteller (1986), pp. 1657–1664.
99.
State v. Dunn, 571 S.E.2d 650, 656–58 (N.C. App. 2002).
100.
The rules of many large states are substantially similar to ABA Rule 1.6. Hall (2017), § 28:8.
101.
Cf. Restatement, § 66(1). Cal. Rule 3-100(B) speaks of commission of a “criminal act reasonably likely to cause death or substantial bodily harm”. Hall (2017), § 28:10.
102.
Restatement, § 67(1) contains language similar to subsections 2 and 3. Hall (2017), § 28:14.
103.
Hall (2017), § 28:10 and § 28:14. Restatement, § 66(3) also emphasizes this.
104.
N.J. RPC 1.6(b)(1–2). Hall (2017), § 28:13.
105.
15 U.S.C.§ 7245; Hall (2017), § 28:31.
106.
14 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1).
107.
Hall (2017), § 28:31.
108.
Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933).
109.
Hall (2017), § 28:33.
110.
Hall (2017), §§ 28:21–22, commenting on Cal. RPC-300 which goes into detail about the factors that should be taken into consideration before revealing future criminal conduct.
111.
Hall (2017), § 28:25.
112.
Hall (2017), § 28:32.
113.
Freedman (2014–2015), pp. 1025–1026.
114.
Ibid, p. 1027.
115.
Preventing a client from testifying perjuriously does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 166 (1986).
116.
People v. Johnson, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 805, 810–11 (Cal. App. 1998); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 781 N.E.2d 1237, 1249–50 (Mass. 2003); People v. Andrades, 828 N.E.2d 599, 600–02 (N.Y. 2005).
117.
State v. McDowell, 681 N.W.2d 500, 514–15 (Wis. 2004).
118.
State v. Berrysmith, 944 P.2d 397, 401–02 (Wash. App. 1997).
119.
United States v. Midgett, 342 F.3d 321, 324–25 (4th Cir. 2003).
120.
People v. DePallo, 754 N.E.2d 751, 753–54 (N.Y. 2001).
121.
Hall (2017), § 28:28. Wemark v. State, 602 N.W.2d 810, 816–17 (Iowa 1999) (murder weapon).
122.
People v. Belge, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798, 801–03 (N.Y. App. 1975). Cf. Hall (2017), § 28:29.
123.
McClure v. Thompson, 323 F.3d 1223, 1243–44 (9th Cir. 2003).
124.
People v. Lee, 83 Cal. Rptr. 715, 722–23 (Cal. App. 1970).
125.
In re January 1976 Grand Jury, 534 F.2d 719, 728 (7th Cir. 1976) (money from a bank robbery).
126.
State ex. rel. Sowers v. Olwell, 394 P.2d 681, 685 (Wash. 1964) (knife used in murder); State v. Carlin, 650 P.2d 324, 327–28 (Kan. App. 1982). Restatement, § 119. Hall (2017), § 28:60.
127.
People v. Meredith, 631 P.2d 46, 54 (Cal. 1981).
128.
State ex. rel. Sowers v. Olwell, 394 P.2d 681, 684–85 (Wash. 1964). Cf. Hall (2017), § 28:37.
129.
Anderson v. State, 297 So.2d 871, 873–75 (Fla. App. 1974).
130.
Sanford v. State, 21 S.W.3d 337, 347 (Tex. App. 2002). Hall (2017), § 28:60.
131.
Commonwealth v. Stenhach, 514 A.2d 114, 123–24 (Pa. Super. 1986).
132.
United States v. Russell, 639 F.Supp.2d 226, 234–36 (D.Conn. 2007).
133.
Brown (2006), p. 898.
134.
Ibid., p. 946.
135.
Cunningham and Srader (2017), pp. 360–361.
136.
See Whitehouse v. U.S. District Court for Dist. of Rhode Island, 53 F.3d 1349, 1352–53 (1st Cir. 1995).
137.
Hall (2017), § 30:1.
138.
In re Grand Jury Proceeding, 721 F.2d 1221, 1223 (9th Cir. 1983).
139.
See People v. Pasillas-Sanchez, 214 P.3d 520, 525–26 (Colo. App. 2009), holding that an attorney cannot serve as both lawyer and witness in the same trial unless the testimony addresses uncontested issues.
140.
United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1349–50 (D. Colo. 1985). For similar criticisms, see United States v. Perry, 857 F.2d 1346, 1347 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 649, 653 (1st Cir. 1987). Cf. Hall (2017), § 30:1.
141.
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238, 243–44 (2d Cir. 1986). Hall (2017), § 30:4.
142.
F.R.Crim. P. 17(c) provides for a motion to quash in the federal system.
143.
For similar rules, see: Colo. RPC Rule 3.8(f); N.H. RPC 4.5; Pa. RPC 3.10; R.I. RPC Rule 3.8(f); Tenn. RPC 3.8(f); W. Va. CPR 4-101(B).
144.
Hall (2017), § 30:4.
145.
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 172.139.
146.
Hall (2017), § 30:6.
147.
F.R.Crim. P. 17(g).
148.
Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 58 (1959); Hall (2017), § 30:7.
149.
Ibid., § 30:7.
150.
Ibid., § 30:9.
151.
Doe v. DiGenova, 642 F. Supp. 624, 631 (D.D.C. 1986); Klitzman, Klitzman & Gallagher v. Krut, 591 F. Supp. 258, 269 (D.N.J. 1984); Hall (2017), § 30:5.
152.
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 43 F.3d 966 (5th Cir. 1994).
153.
Hall (2017), § 30:2.
154.
F.R.Crim. P. 17(c)(2).
155.
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403–05 (1976). Hall (2017), § 30:2.
156.
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328–29 (1973).
157.
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976).
158.
People v. Nash, 341 N.W.2d 439, 447 (Mich. 1983); Fenwick & West v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. Rptr.2d 294, 297 (Cal. App.1996); People v. Hearty, 644 P.2d 302, 303 (Colo. 1982). Hall (2017), § 30:10.
159.
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479–82 (1976).
160.
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 553–68 (1978).
161.
DeMassa v. Nunez, 770 F.2d 1505, 1506–07 (9th Cir. 1985).
162.
People v. Superior Court (Laff), 23 P.3d 563, 569 (Cal. 2001) (suggesting lawyer should seek a court order preventing revelation of privileged materials).
163.
28 C.F.R. § 59.4(b)(3); Hall (2017), § 30:5.
164.
Or. Rev. Stat. § 9.695 (1981).
165.
O’Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 400–05 (Minn. 1979); Hall (2017), § 30:12.
166.
In re Search Warrant B-21778, 521 A.2d 422 (Penn. 1987); Deukmejian v. Superior Court, 162 Cal. Rptr. 857, 862 (Cal. App. 1980).
167.
See Hall (2017), § 30:12.
168.
People v. Nash, 341 N.W.2d 439, 447 (Mich. 1983).
169.
Hall (2017), § 30:14.
170.
In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated December 10, 1987, 926 F2d 847, 858 (9th Cir 1991); In re Impounded Case (Law Firm), 840 F2d 196, 202 (3d Cir 1988). The American Law Institute, in §§ 220.2(4), 220.5 of its Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, has provided, that in situations “where documents are so intermingled that they cannot feasibly be sorted on site”, law enforcements should not search them until after a judicial hearing. This suggestion was followed in United States v. Tamura, 694 F2d 591, 595–96 (9th Cir 1982). See McArthur (2004), pp. 743 and 750.
171.
United States v. Hunter, 13 S.Supp.2d 574, 583 (D. Vt. 1998); United States v. Neill, 952 F.Supp. 834, 840 (D. D.C. 1997); In re Search Warrant for Law offices Executed on March 19, 1992, 153 F.R.D. 55, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). See McArthur (2004), p. 751.
172.
Van Voris and Voreacos (2018).
173.
Rubin (2018).
174.
People v. Superior Court (Bauman & Rose), 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 734, 739 (Cal. App. 1995).
175.
Geilim v. Superior Court, 285 Cal. Rptr. 602, 608–09 (Cal. App. 1991). See Hall (2017), § 30:13.
176.
See People v. Hearty, 644 P.2d, 302, 311 (Colo. 1982).
177.
Klitzman, Klitzman and Gallagher v. Krut, 744 F.2d 955, 957–62 (3d Cir. 1984). See McArthur (2004), p. 743.
178.
Nordstrom v. Ryan, 856 F.3d 1265, 1271–72 (2017).
179.
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 557–58 (1977).
180.
United States v. Curcio, 608 F.Supp. 1346, 1356 (D.C. Conn. 1985).
181.
Barber v. Superior Court, 598 P.2d 818, 826–28 (Cal. 1979).
182.
State v. Soto, 933 P.2d 66, 76–77 (Hawaii 1997).
183.
United States v. Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508, 1510 (11th Cir. 1987). See Cunningham and Srader (2017), p. 336.
184.
Pub. L. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197. The law is commonly called “Title III”.
185.
United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d 478, 481 (3d Cir. l974).
186.
18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b).
187.
50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq.
188.
50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1).
189.
50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(1).
190.
Thaman (2018), pp. 259–260.
191.
50 U.S.C. § 1881a.
192.
Schwartz (2008), p. 308.
193.
State v. Quattlebaum, 527 S.E.2d 105, 109 (S.C. 2000).
194.
In re Neary, 84 N.E.3d 1194, 1197–98 (Ind. 2017). In one case, the eavesdropping led to the discovery of a gun used in a homicide.
195.
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984). See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) which held that the 4th Amend. only protects conversations and other activities where a person has a “reasonable expectation of privacy.”
196.
United States v. Paul, 614 F.2d 115, 117–20 (6th Cir. 1980).
197.
Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143–44 (1962); Krilich v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 346 F.3d 157, 159 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Noriega, 764 F.Supp. 1480, 1485 (S.D. Fla. 1991). See Cassidy and Porsch (2004), p. 684.
198.
“ABA Says Inmate-Lawyer E-Mails Should be Shielded”, Criminal Law Reporter (BNA), Feb. 10, 2016. https://www.bna.com/aba-says-inmatelawyer-n57982067171.
199.
United States v. Neill, 952 F.Supp. 834, 841 (D.D.C. 1997). See Cassidy and Porsch (2004), p. 682.
200.
Shenon (2008).
201.
Clapper v. Amnesty International, U.S.A., 568 U.S. 398, 404–05 (2013).
202.
Shenon (2008).
203.
United States v. DePalma, 461 F.Supp. 800, 821 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
204.
McArthur (2004), p. 747.
205.
Niarchos (2014).
206.
United States v. Hyde, 574 F.2d 856, 870 (5th Cir.1978).
207.
See United States v. Gotti, 771 F.Supp. 535, 543–44 (E.D. N.Y. 1991).
208.
United States v. Cleveland, 964 F.Supp. 1073, 1097 (E.D. La. 1997) (allowing spot checks); McArthur (2004), pp. 749–750.
209.
People v. Alexander, 235 P.3d 873, 888–93 (Cal. 2010).
210.
Savage (2016).
211.
Niarchos (2014).
212.
Shenon (2008).
213.
Cunningham and Srader (2017), pp. 311–313.
214.
28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d)(2–3).
215.
Cunningham and Srader (2017), pp. 317 and 326–327.
216.
NACDL Ethics Opinion, 19, cited in Cassidy and Porsch (2004), p. 691.
217.
Savage (2018).
218.
Simon (2015), p. 354.
219.
Ibid., pp. 354–355.
220.
Ibid., pp. 355–356.
221.
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 203–04 (1964).
222.
United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
223.
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971).
224.
Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 594 (2009).
225.
United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 643–44 (2004). In a few states, however, physical fruits of a Miranda violation are also inadmissible. State v. Knapp, 700 N.W.2d 899, 917–21 (Wis. 2005); Commonwealth v. Martin, 827 N.E.2d 198, 200–03 (Mass. 2005); State v. Peterson, 923 A.2d 585, 588–93 (Vt. 2007); State v. Vondehn, 236 P.3d 691, 695–98 (Or. 2010).
226.
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 446–48 (1984).
227.
United States v. Kimball, 884 F.2d 1274, 1278–80 (9th Cir. 1989).
228.
People v. Frazier, 733 N.W.2d 713, 722–25 (Mich. 2007).
229.
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 241–42 (1967).
230.
Barber v. Superior Court, 598 P.2d 818, 826–28 (Cal. 1979).
231.
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437–38 (2000).
232.
See Sect. 4.1, supra.
233.
Cunningham and Srader (2017), p. 338.
234.
Fajeriak v. State, 520 P.2d 795, 799 (Alaska 1974); People v. Holman, 356 N.Y.S.2d 958, 961 (N.Y. 1974). Cunningham and Srader (2017), pp. 338–339.
235.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633–38 (1886).
236.
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301–02 (1967).
237.
United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 617 (1984); United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 36–37 (2000).
238.
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Dated April 18, 2003 (Doe v. United States), 383 F.3d 905, 910–12 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Ponds, 454 F.3d 313, 324–25 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (involving subpoena of criminal defense lawyer suspected of concealment of client fees).
239.
United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 39–40 (2000).
240.
In Hubbell, the government tried to claim that it was a “foregone conclusion” that “everyone has ordinary income, financial and business records.” The USSC rejected this notion. 530 U.S. 27, 29 (2000).
241.
Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1948). “Required” records must be regulatory in nature. Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1968).
242.
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69–70 (1906).
243.
United States v. Braswell, 487 U.S. 99 (1988).
244.
Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 95–96 (1974).
245.
Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 866 (8th Cir. 1956). McArthur (2004), p. 744.
246.
Or. Rev. Stat. § 9.695(4) (1981). Hall (2017), § 30:12.
247.
United States v. White, 970 F.2d 328, 336 (7th Cir. 1992). McArthur (2004), p. 737.
248.
United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542, 560 (4th Cir. 2000); Nickel v Hannigan, 97 F3d 403,409 (10th Cir 1996); United States v. White, 970 F2d 328, 336 (7th Cir 1992). McArthur (2004), pp. 752–753.
249.
Klitzman, Klitzman and Gallagher v. Krut, 744 F.2d 955, 960–61 (3rd Cir. 1984).
250.
Fed. R. Crim. Pro.41(g), see Application of First United Financial Corp. for Return of Seized Property, 620 F. Supp. 1450, 1452 (E.D. N.Y. 1985). Hall (2017), § 30:15.
251.
18 U.S.C. § 2517(4).
252.
18 U.S.C. § 2515. FISA has a similarly expansive exclusionary rule. 50 U.S.C. § 1806(c,e).
253.
People in re. A.W., 982 P.2d 842, 849 (Colo. 1999).
254.
United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 574–75 (1974).
255.
Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137–39 (1978).
256.
United States v. Hoffman, 832 F.2d 1299, 1309 (1st Cir. 1989).
257.
United States v. Turner, 528 F.2d 143, 156 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Suquet, 547 F.Supp. 1034, 1039 (N.D. Ill. 1982). McArthur (2004), p. 752.
258.
United States v. Ozar, 50 F.3d 1440, 1448 (8th Cir. 1995). McArthur (2004), p. 752.
259.
The only exceptions have been: Gennusa v. Shoar, 879 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1348–49 (M.D. Fl. 2012) and Lonegan v. Hasty, 436 F. Supp.2d 419, 433–36 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). Simon (2015), p. 348.
260.
For one example, see Stuntz (2011).
261.
Backus and Marcus (2006), p. 1034.
262.
Thaman (2016), p. 75.
263.
Thaman (2010), pp. 370 and 374.
264.
Brown (2006), pp. 900–901.
265.
Ibid, p. 947.
266.
Ibid, p. 939.
267.
Cassidy and Porsch (2004), p. 695.
268.
Cunningham and Srader (2017), p. 361.
269.
Ibid., pp. 361–362.

Abbreviations

ABA:: American Bar Association
Amend.:: Amendment
BOP:: Federal Bureau of Prisons Rules
DSO:: Defense security officer
FBI:: Federal Bureau of Investigation
FISA:: Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
FISC:: U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
NACDL:: National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
NSA:: National Security Agency
OCDC:: Office of Chief Defense Counsel
SAMs:: Special Administrative Measures
SCA:: Stored Communications Act
SEC:: Securities and Exchange Commission
URE:: Uniform Rules of Evidence
U.S.:: United States
USDOJ:: U.S. Department of Justice
USSC:: United States Supreme Court

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Stephen C. Thaman

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Lorena Bachmaier Winter
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Stephen C. Thaman
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Veronica Lynn

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Thaman, S.C. (2020). Confidentiality of Attorney-Client Communications in the United States. In: Bachmaier Winter, L., Thaman, S., Lynn, V. (eds) The Right to Counsel and the Protection of Attorney-Client Privilege in Criminal Proceedings. Ius Comparatum - Global Studies in Comparative Law, vol 44. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-43123-5_14

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