Abstract
We clear up confusion surrounding privacy claims about the ICAO 9303 standard for e-passports. The ICAO 9303 standard includes a Basic Access Control (BAC) protocol that should protect the user from being traced from one session to another. While it is well known that there are attacks on BAC, allowing an attacker to link multiple uses of the same passport, due to differences in implementation; there still remains confusion about whether there is an attack on unlinkability directly on the BAC protocol as specified in the ICAO 9303 standard. This paper clarifies the nature of the debate, and sources of potential confusion. We demonstrate that the original privacy claims made are flawed, by uncovering attacks on a strong formulation of unlinkability. We explain why the use of the bisimilarity equivalence technique is essential for uncovering our attacks. We also clarify what assumptions lead to proofs of formulations of unlinkability using weaker notions of equivalence. Furthermore, we propose a fix for BAC within the scope of the standard, and prove that it is correct, again using a state-of-the-art approach to bisimilarity.
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Notes
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This information on an old bug in ProVerif is due to Stéphanie Delaune and Vincent Cheval.
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Acknowledgements
We thank the following people for their time and knowledge during the investigation of these results: Vincent Cheval, Ugo Chirico, Stéphanie Delaune, Lucca Hirschi, and Steve Kremer.
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Filimonov, I., Horne, R., Mauw, S., Smith, Z. (2019). Breaking Unlinkability of the ICAO 9303 Standard for e-Passports Using Bisimilarity. In: Sako, K., Schneider, S., Ryan, P. (eds) Computer Security – ESORICS 2019. ESORICS 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11735. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29959-0_28
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