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Contextualism, Factivity and Closure pp 9–27Cite as

“Knowledge” in Context: A Conundrum

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Abstract

Contextualism is the thesis that the truth-conditions of knowledge-ascribing and knowledge-denying sentences can vary depending on certain features of the context of the knowledge attributor. According to a recent objection labelled “the factivity problem”, contextualism, if combined with the principle of factivity and with the principle of closure, would turn out to be an inconsistent theory. In this chapter are presented the contextualist stance—from both a semantic and an epistemic point of view—the argument of the factivity problem and the implications of the issue.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The characterization of indexicality that we will use is the following: a linguistic expression is indexical iff its content depends on the features of its context of utterance. This characterization of indexicality is due to MacFarlane (2009), who distinguishes it from the semantic phenomenon of context-sensitivity—a linguistic expression is context-sensitive iff its extension depends on the features of its context of utterance. Uncontroversial examples of indexical expressions in this sense are those belonging to Cappelen and Lepore’s basic set (2005): pure indexicals like “I” and “here”, true demonstratives like “this” and “that”, personal pronouns like “he” and “she”.

  2. 2.

    For an analysis of the different features that may determine the epistemic standard in a context see Baumann (2016: 20–31).

  3. 3.

    The term “invariantism” is generally used to label the position of those who deny contextualism with regard to a certain term. See Unger (1984). Here we will use this expression to denote those who claim that there is one and only one epistemic standard for “know”.

  4. 4.

    We slightly modified DeRose’s example since in its original formulation it is a first person case (i.e. a case where the ascriber corresponds to the person to whom is ascribed knowledge) and this sort of examples is consistent with subject-sensitive invariantism, a view that like classical invariantism claims that “know” expresses the same relation at every context of use, but unlike it holds that whether a subject “knows that p may be determined in part by practical facts about the subject’s environment” (Stanley 2005: 85; see also Hawthorne (2004: 157 ff). On this point see Blackson (2004). Third person cases (where the ascriber does not correspond to the person to whom knowledge is ascribed) provide, instead, a better ground to illustrate the contextualist thesis. For an illustration and a defence of the contextualist’s strategy appealing to this kind of cases see DeRose (2009: 47–79). See also Pynn (2017) for discussion.

  5. 5.

    On this point see also Leardi and Vassallo (2017). Notice that the invariantists (or, more precisely, non-sceptical invariantists) have proposed arguments to show that (10) is true simpliciter and that, instead of being false in the latter scenario, it would be conversationally inappropriate. On this point see Rysiew (2001), Black (2008), and Pritchard (2010). For a contextualist response to these arguments see Baumann (2011) and Leardi and Vassallo (2017).

  6. 6.

    According to MacFarlane the argument from cases (like DeRose’s Bank case or Cohen’s Airport case) would not yield the alleged result: indeed, if this sort of argument straightforwardly supports the view that knowledge ascriptions are context-sensitive (i.e. that their truth-value depend upon their context of utterance) it would not clearly provide evidence for their indexicality. See MacFarlane (2009) for discussion.

  7. 7.

    Pritchard moves an objection against contextualism along these lines, even though he limits his remark to contextualism as a semantic thesis without considering the possible metaphysical implications of the view. Pritchard, indeed, observes that one might think that, since according to a certain reading of contextualism the epistemic standards can be hierarchically ordered, in the end, the only epistemic standard worth of epistemological concern is that employed by the sceptic (2005: 25). For a reply to Pritchard’s objection see Leardi and Vassallo (2017).

  8. 8.

    The most notable exceptions to the acceptation of the closure principle are those of Nozick (1981) and Dretske (1970, 1971, 2014).

  9. 9.

    For example, this version of the closure principle strongly connects the belief that q with the deduction from p, avoiding an objection according which one might come to know q on a completely independent basis. For an analysis of the closure principle see Vogel (1990), Hawthorne (2014) and Luper (2016).

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  1. School of Humanities, University of Genoa, Genoa, Italy

    Stefano Leardi & Nicla Vassallo

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  1. Stefano Leardi
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Correspondence to Stefano Leardi .

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Leardi, S., Vassallo, N. (2018). “Knowledge” in Context: A Conundrum. In: Contextualism, Factivity and Closure. SpringerBriefs in Philosophy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16155-2_2

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