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Game Analysis of the WTO Dispute Settlement

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Proceedings of the 2012 International Conference on Cybernetics and Informatics

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering ((LNEE,volume 163))

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Abstract

On the basis of the process of WTO dispute settlement, a four stages game model is established to analyze the strategy choices during the dispute settlement process. The solutions and conditions of strategy choices are also given in the article. It is concluded that small number of countries choose to settle by consultation and most countries choose to settle by panel, and most cases end with implementing the WTO’s decision. Statistical analysis of cases from 1995 to 2011 provides the same conclusions.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. College of Economics, Jinan University, No. 601, Huangpu Road West, Guangzhou, China

    Shihui Yang & Ran Xu

Authors
  1. Shihui Yang
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  2. Ran Xu
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Shihui Yang .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. College of Elementary Education, Chongqing Normal University, Chongqing, People's Republic of China

    Shaobo Zhong

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Yang, S., Xu, R. (2014). Game Analysis of the WTO Dispute Settlement. In: Zhong, S. (eds) Proceedings of the 2012 International Conference on Cybernetics and Informatics. Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering, vol 163. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-3872-4_132

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-3872-4_132

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4614-3871-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4614-3872-4

  • eBook Packages: EngineeringEngineering (R0)

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