In this chapter, my aim is to give a brief outline of the aesthetics that forms part of the Nishida tetsugaku(Nishida's philosophy) and draw from it a more general lesson. In aesthetics as in the whole of the rest of his philosophy, Nishida has a special value for students of comparative thought. As my Japanese colleagues have told me repeatedly, Nishida was one of the last Japanese to be brought up in what they call the old Japanese way of thinking. What is unique to him is his sustained attempt, carried on at the highest level of philosophical endeavor, to try to articulate his interpretation of experience, an experience formed by Zen and centrally dependent on the ideas of the prajñaparamitāsutras, in terms of categorial frameworks drawn from the western philosophies that so fascinated him. What emerges from this lifelong task is a philosophy that, though articulated in different categorial frameworks, is manifestly unchanged in its essentials.1 It is a philosophy that (I would argue) articulates a view of experience that is simply incommensurable with that which informs the mainstream of western thought, especially as the latter derives from Aristotelian logic. It is a deeplydifferent way of understanding the world and of being human. What makes the case of Nishida so uniquely valuable is precisely that he illuminates this deep difference by pushing western philosophical categories to their limit. In the end, he found that in order to say what he had to say, he had to disagree with western assumptions at their most basic level, including the law of identity and the principle of contradiction, among the bedrock laws of Aristotelian thought.
To reinforce the case for incommensurability, at appropriate points below, I will refer to aesthetic theories developed by western thinkers, especially those with an idealist cast that might at first look quite similar to that of Nishida. The reason for doing so is to demonstrate that in fact the relation between Nishida's view and close western analogues is in fact never, in the last analysis, one of identity. Ultimately, I will suggest that for reasons deep in metaphysics there must remain a final difference between an aesthetic based on Nishida's premises and any based on what I term Aristotelian, individualist assumptions.
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Notes and References
Some scholars identify three major phases in Nishida's thought, others four, the latter regarding the emphasis to be found in his last works on the historical world, as sufficient to differentiate this phase from the mu no bashophase. I would argue that this is to a degree a matter of intellectual taste: the categorial framework based on the place of nothingness remains unchanged in the last works though he does place there additional stress on the importance of the historical world — Nishida changes the emphasis rather than radically changing the basic categories of his thought. The earlier changes in Nishida tetsugakuare more radical: those from the pure experience phase to the Fichte-Kant stage, and from the latter to the place of nothingness phase, are much deeper
This statement from the Heart Sutrais typical: “…form is emptiness and the very emptiness is form; emptiness does not differ from form, form does not differ from emptiness; whatever is form, that is emptiness, whatever is emptiness, that is form, the same is true of feelings, perceptions, impulses and consciousness.” Buddhist Wisdom BooksTrans: Edward Conze, London: Allen and Unwin, 1958, p. 81
Early Memoriesin M. Abe (ed.) A Zen Life: D.T. Suzuki Remembered, New York: Weatherhill, 1986, p. 11
AM, pp. 107–108
NRWV, p. 77
The idea that in the context of aesthetic experience emotions are in us but not predicable of us is to be found in R.K. Elliott's Aesthetic Theory and the Experience of Art, 1966, reprinted in H. Osborne (ed.) Aesthetics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972, p. 147. Elliott is following Plato's distinction (Lysis, 217C-218B) between ignorance that is in a person and predica-ble of that person and ignorance that is in a person but not predicable of them
AM, p. 112
AM, p. 15. In An Inquiry into the Good, Nishida uses aesthetic experience as a means to indicate what pure experience is like: “Just like when we become enraptured by exquisite music, forget ourselves and everything around us, and experience the universe as one melodious sound, true reality presents itself in the moment of direct experience.” IG, p. 48
AM, p. 14. See also Nishida's essay Affective feelingin Y. Nitta and H. Tatematsu (eds.) Japanese Phenomenology, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979, pp. 223–247 (a translation of Kanjó from Ishiki no mondai/The Problem of Consciousness, 1920)
Wackenroder: How and in what manner one must regard and use the Works of the Great Artists of Earth for the Well-Being of his Soulin M.H. Schubert (ed. and trans.) Wackenroder's Confessions and Fantasies, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press, 1971, p. 126. The same point is made, for instance, in August Wilhelm Schlegel's Lectures on Belles-lettres and Art (Vorlesungen über schöne Literatur und Kunst), 1801: “In the solemn, steady movement of devotional movement, there is inherent in every instant a sense of harmony and perfection, a unity of existence which to Christians is an image of heavenly bliss,” and in P. LeHuray and J. Day (eds.) Music and Aesthetics in the Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 195
As he puts it in NRWV: “…the mystical has no use at all in our practical lives. Were religion some kind of special consciousness of privileged persons it would merely be the idle matter of idle men.” p. 115. The same careful and emphatic refusal to identify aesthetic experience with religious experience can be found in the thought of the great Kashmiri aesthetician Abhinavagupta, whose views can be fruitfully compared with those of Nishida on the one hand and relevant western theories on the other. There is an excellent summary of Abhinava's views with full references to primary sources in Chantal Maillard and Oscar Pujol Rasa: El placer estético en la tradición India, Varanasi: Indica, 1999, pp. 88
Edward Bullough ‘Psychical Distance’ as a Factor in Art and an Aesthetic Principle, 1912 reprinted in E.M. Wilkinson (ed.), Aesthetics: Lectures and Essays, Westport (Conn.): Greenwood Press, 1977, pp. 91–130
AM, p. 5
AM, pp. 8–9
AM, p. 185, cf. Kant Critique of Judgment, Analytic of the Beautiful,Third Moment
Nishida stresses the dynamic nature of reality in many places, e.g., “the most immediate, concrete reality for us is a system of self-generating, self-developing experience.” IRSC, p. 64
AM, pp. 15–16 and 162
Novalis: Miscellaneous Observations, para. 17 in M.M. Stoljar (ed. and trans.) Novalis: Philosophical Writings, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997, p. 25
IG, pp. 39–40
AM, p. 19
AM, p. 20
AM, p. 27
AM, loc. cit
IRSC, p. 131
AM, p. 52. The thesis that what we ordinarily call the natural world is a constructed abstraction is present in Nishida's thought from the start, cf. IG, Ch. 12, passim
AM, p. 161
AM, p. 187
IRSC, pp. 145 and 153
AM, p. 33
IRSC, p. 156
AM, p. 47
AM, p. 103
AM, p. 104
AM, p. 26; cf. R.G. Collingwood The Principles of Art, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1938, pp. 20–26
Cf. Collingwood, op. cit., Ch. XIV, passim
AM, p. 34
AM, p. 35
AM, pp. 35 and 103
AM, p. 164
AM, pp. 98–99; cf. Aristotle Poetics1451b
Friedrich Schlegel Ideaspara. 16 in P. Firchow (trans.) Friedrich Schlegel: Philosophical Fragments, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991, p. 95
Friedrich Schlegel Ideaspara. 146 in Firchow, op. cit., p. 108
AM, p. 163
AM, p. 104. On the difference between the moral and religious viewpoints, see also Nishida's remarks on Kierkegaard in NRWV, p. 96. (The reception of Kierkegaard in Japan, and the reasons for it, is a subject of considerable interest in its own right. A good starting point is Masugata Kinya Kierkegaard's Reception in Japan, Memoirs of Osaka Kyoiku University, series 1, v. 38, no. 1, 1989, pp. 49–65, in which Nishida's reaction to Kierkegaard's thought, together with that of many other Japanese, is summarized)
IRSC, p. 153
IRSC, p. 151
NRWV, p. 93
IRSC, p. 27
IRSC, p. 48
I have developed this idea at more length in an essay East is East and West is Westin Cristina Chimisso (ed.) Exploring European Identities, Milton Keynes, UK: The Open University, 2003, pp. 230–262
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Wilkinson, R. (2009). Nishida, Aesthetics, and the Limits of Cultural Synthesis. In: Van den Braembussche, A., Kimmerle, H., Note, N. (eds) Intercultural Aesthetics. Einstein Meets Margritte: An Interdisciplinary Reflection on Science, Nature, Art, Human Action and Society, vol 9. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-5780-9_6
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