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International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics

WINE 2006: Internet and Network Economics pp 319–330Cite as

Price of Anarchy for Polynomial Wardrop Games

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 4286))

Abstract

In this work, we consider Wardrop games where traffic has to be routed through a shared network. Traffic is allowed to be split into arbitrary pieces and can be modeled as network flow. For each edge in the network there is a latency function that specifies the time needed to traverse the edge given its congestion. In a Wardrop equilibrium, all used paths between a given source-destination pair have equal and minimal latency.

In this paper, we allow for polynomial latency functions with an upper bound d and a lower bound s on the degree of all monomials that appear in the polynomials. For this environment, we prove upper and lower bounds on the price of anarchy.

This work has been partially supported by the DFG-SFB 376 and by the European Union within the Integrated Project IST-15964 ”Algorithmic Principles for Building Efficient Overlay Computers” (AEOLUS).

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Computer Science, Electrical Engineering and Mathematics, University of Paderborn, Fürstenallee 11, 33102, Paderborn, Germany

    Dominic Dumrauf & Martin Gairing

Authors
  1. Dominic Dumrauf
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  2. Martin Gairing
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Engineering and Informatics, University of Patras, 26500, Rio, Patras, Greece

    Paul Spirakis

  2. Department of Computer Science, University of Cyprus, CY-1678, Nicosia, Cyprus

    Marios Mavronicolas

  3. R.A. Computer Technology Institute, N. Kazantzakis Str., University Campus, 26500, Rio–Patra, Greece

    Spyros Kontogiannis

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Dumrauf, D., Gairing, M. (2006). Price of Anarchy for Polynomial Wardrop Games. In: Spirakis, P., Mavronicolas, M., Kontogiannis, S. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4286. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11944874_29

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11944874_29

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-68138-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-68141-0

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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