Abstract
We give a simple analysis of the competitive ratio of the random sampling auction from [10]. The random sampling auction was first shown to be worst-case competitive in [9] (with a bound of 7600 on its competitive ratio); our analysis improves the bound to 15. In support of the conjecture that random sampling auction is in fact 4-competitive, we show that on the equal revenue input, where any sale price gives the same revenue, random sampling is exactly a factor of four from optimal.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Aggarwal, G., Hartline, J.: Knapsack Auctions. In: Proc. 17th Symp. on Discrete Alg. ACM/SIAM, Philadelphia (2006)
Balcan, M.-F., Blum, A., Hartline, J., Mansour, Y.: Mechanism Design via Machine Learning. In: Proc. of the 46th IEEE Symp. on Foundations of Computer Science (2005)
Baliga, S., Vohra, R.: Market research and market design. Advances in Theoretical Economics 3 (2003)
Borgs, C., Chayes, J., Immorlica, N., Mahdian, M., Saberi, A.: Multi-unit Auctions with Budget-constrained Bidders. In: Proc. of 6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. ACM Press, New York (2005)
Cardano, G.: Ars Magna (Artis magnae sive de regulis algebrae liber unus), p. 1545. Nuremberg
Feller, W.: An Introduction to Probability Theory and its Applications, 3rd edn., vol. 1. John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York (1968)
Fiat, A., Goldberg, A., Hartline, J., Karlin, A.: Competitive Generalized Auctions. In: Proc. 34th ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing. ACM Press, New York (2002)
Goldberg, A., Hartline, J.: Competitive auctions for multiple digital goods. In: Meyer auf der Heide, F. (ed.) ESA 2001. LNCS, vol. 2161, p. 416. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
Goldberg, A., Hartline, J., Karlin, A., Saks, M., Wright, A.: Competitive auctions and digital goods. In: Games and Economic Behavior (2002) (to appear); An earlier version appeared as InterTrust Technical Report STAR-TR-99-09-01
Goldberg, A., Hartline, J., Wright, A.: Competitive Auctions and Digital Goods. In: Proc. 12th Symp. on Discrete Alg., pp. 735–744. ACM/SIAM (2001)
Hajiaghayi, M., Kleinberg, R., Parkes, D.: Adaptive Limited-Supply Online Auctions. In: Proc. of 5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. ACM Press, New York (2004)
Segal, I.: Optimal pricing mechanisms with unknown demand. American Economic Review 16, 509–529 (2003)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Feige, U., Flaxman, A., Hartline, J.D., Kleinberg, R. (2005). On the Competitive Ratio of the Random Sampling Auction. In: Deng, X., Ye, Y. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3828. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11600930_89
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11600930_89
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-30900-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-32293-1
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)