Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

A Simple Characterization for Truth-Revealing Single-Item Auctions

  • Conference paper
Internet and Network Economics (WINE 2005)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 3828))

Included in the following conference series:

  • 1927 Accesses

Abstract

We give a simple characterization of all single-item truth-revealing auctions under some mild (and natural) assumptions about the auctions. Our work opens up the possibility of using variational calculus to design auctions having desired properties.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Google adwords, adwords.google.com

  2. Overture online tutorial, http://www.overture.com

  3. Clarke, E.H.: Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice (1971)

    Google Scholar 

  4. Goldberg, A., Hartline, J., Wright, A.: Competitive auctions and digital goods. In: SODA (2001)

    Google Scholar 

  5. Groves, T.: Incentives in teams. Econometrica (1973)

    Google Scholar 

  6. Jain, K., Talwar, K.: Repeated budgeted ad auctions (2005) (manuscript)

    Google Scholar 

  7. Moulin, H., Shenker, S.: Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs: budget balance versus efficiency. Economic Theory (2001)

    Google Scholar 

  8. Roberts, K.: The characterization of implementable choice rules. In: Laffont, J.J. (ed.) Aggregation and revelation of preferences, pp. 321–349 (1979)

    Google Scholar 

  9. Vickrey, W.: Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. J. of Finance (1961)

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Microsoft Research, Redmond, WA

    Kamal Jain

  2. College of Computing, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, USA

    Aranyak Mehta & Vijay Vazirani

  3. Microsoft Research, Silicon Valley

    Kunal Talwar

Authors
  1. Kamal Jain
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Aranyak Mehta
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  3. Kunal Talwar
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  4. Vijay Vazirani
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, City University of Hong Kong, Tat Chee Avenue, Kowloon ,, Hong Kong

    Xiaotie Deng

  2. Stanford University, Stanford, CA

    Yinyu Ye

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2005 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Jain, K., Mehta, A., Talwar, K., Vazirani, V. (2005). A Simple Characterization for Truth-Revealing Single-Item Auctions. In: Deng, X., Ye, Y. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3828. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/11600930_13

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/11600930_13

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-30900-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-32293-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation