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The predictive role of counterfactuals

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Abstract

We suggest a model that describes how counterfactuals are constructed and justified. The model can describe how counterfactual beliefs are updated given the unfolding of actual history. It also allows us to examine the use of counterfactuals in prediction, and to show that a logically omniscient reasoner gains nothing from using counterfactuals for prediction.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Università Bocconi, Milan, Italy

    Alfredo Di Tillio

  2. Tel-Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel

    Itzhak Gilboa

  3. HEC Paris, Jouy-en-Josas, France

    Itzhak Gilboa

  4. Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA

    Larry Samuelson

Authors
  1. Alfredo Di Tillio
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  2. Itzhak Gilboa
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  3. Larry Samuelson
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Correspondence to Alfredo Di Tillio.

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Di Tillio, A., Gilboa, I. & Samuelson, L. The predictive role of counterfactuals. Theory Decis 74, 167–182 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-011-9263-6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-011-9263-6

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