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Introduction to the special issue on 4E cognition

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Notes

  1. This list does not include distributed and situated models of cognition.

  2. Which is usually understood as cognition as the manipulation of representations. Despite Adams’ and Aizawa’s protestations to the contrary, I do not think that cognitivism is committed to anything stronger than this. Indeed, it would be unwise for cognitivists to hold to Adams’ and Aizawa’s stronger version of cognitivism—that only manipulations of representations with underived content count as cognitive—as this leads to the counter-intuitive conclusion that the many examples of empirical work on the brain’s transformation by internalising public symbol systems do not count as cognition.

  3. Cognitive processes and representations supervene upon the brain.

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Menary, R. Introduction to the special issue on 4E cognition. Phenom Cogn Sci 9, 459–463 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-010-9187-6

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