Abstract
This article presents an analytic model for understanding the role of decision makers in bringing about significant policy and institutional changes and in understanding how processes of agenda setting, decision making, and implementation shape the content, timing, and sustainability of reform initiatives. Central to the model is the assertion that policy elites and the policy making process are important determinants of reform. The framework indicates that circumstances surrounding issue formation, the criteria that decision makers use to select among options, and the characteristics of specific policies are analytic categories that explain a considerable amount about reform outcomes. The model is based on cases developed by participants in twelve initiatives to bring about policy and institutional change in a variety of developing countries.
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Grindle, M.S., Thomas, J.W. Policy makers, policy choices, and policy outcomes: The political economy of reform in developing countries . Policy Sci 22, 213–248 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00136320
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00136320