Regular ArticleThe Validity of the Handicap Principle in Discrete Action–Response Games
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Cited by (46)
Strategic inattention in the Sir Philip Sidney Game
2021, Journal of Theoretical BiologyDoes the handicap principle explain the evolution of dimorphic ornaments?
2018, Animal BehaviourHonesty through repeated interactions
2016, Journal of Theoretical BiologyCitation Excerpt :What is required is that the two parties interact repeatedly and are capable of recognizing each other (see Tibbetts and Dale, 2007 for a discussion of the evidence for individual recognition in many different contexts). These equilibria provide a concrete illustration of the observation that signal costs need not be present in equilibrium, but rather it is marginal cost – the cost outside of equilibrium – that is critical (Hurd, 1995; Számadó, 1999; Lachmann et al., 2001). In these RBE the cost is imposed when the parent punishes too-frequent signaling by withholding the resource.
Why does costly signalling evolve? Challenges with testing the handicap hypothesis
2015, Animal BehaviourCitation Excerpt :No one has proposed how to measure such strategic costs, and the jay experiment did not attempt to distinguish strategic versus efficacy costs of signalling, which is the basis for this definition of handicaps. Polnaszek and Stephens (2014, p. 6) also cited Grafen's (1990) strategic handicap hypothesis as the ‘authoritative mathematical statement of the handicap principle’; however, criticisms of his model (Getty, 1998, 2006) and conclusions (Hurd, 1995; Lachmann et al., 2001; Számadó, 1999, 2011) were too lightly brushed off. Grafen's (1990) main results were that (1) signals are honest, (2) signals are costly and (3) signals are costlier for worse signallers, and yet these conditions have all been challenged by later models and empirical results (see Számadó, 2011 for a review).
Pervasive signaling
2023, Theoretical Economics
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