Regular Article
Deviations, Dynamics, and Equilibrium Refinements

https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0001Get rights and content

Abstract

Existing equilibrium refinements rule out Nash equilibria susceptible to deviations. We propose a framework for considering not only equilibria impervious to deviations, but also equilibria likely to recur in the long run because they are repeatedly deviated to. We explore which equilibria are recurrent with respect to the deviations underlying some existing signaling refinements. We show that the set of recurrent equilibria based on Cho and Kreps's (1987) intuitive criterion is equivalent to their solution concept, but that applying our framework to existing cheap-talk refinements make those solution concepts more realistic and guarantee existence where their current formulations do not.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: B49, C72, C73.

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