Regular ArticleDeviations, Dynamics, and Equilibrium Refinements
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Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games
2015, Games and Economic BehaviorCitation Excerpt :Unfortunately, both Farrell's neologism proofness and Matthews et al.'s (strong) announcement proofness criteria eliminate all equilibria in many games, including the original Crawford–Sobel game.4 Several other types of concepts have been proposed that distinguish between stable and unstable equilibria (or profiles), such as Partial Common Interest (PCI) (Blume et al., 1993), the recurrent mop (Rabin and Sobel, 1996) and No Incentive To Separate (NITS) (Chen et al., 2008). These criteria often select a plausible equilibrium in specific settings, but fail to discriminate successfully across a wider range of cheap talk games.
Equilibrium refinement vs. level-k analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information
2009, Games and Economic BehaviorRich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria
2006, Journal of Economic TheoryInformal communication
2004, Journal of Economic TheoryEvolution of communication with partial common interest
2001, Games and Economic BehaviorA dynamic model of equilibrium selection in signaling markets
1997, Journal of Economic Theory
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